During the Atlanta Campaign, General Sherman Writes General Thomas on Movements Against the enemy

IIn preparation for the campaigns of 1864, President Lincoln appointed General Ulysses S. Grant commander-in-chief of all the Union armies in the field. Grant quickly developed a plan to take maximum advantage of his superior manpower by constantly hammering Confederate armies in Virginia and Georgia and keeping both so fully occupied it would be impossible for either to detach reinforcements to the other. They might then be defeated either separately or serially. General Sherman was assigned command in the west and given the mission of defeating the army of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston, capturing Atlanta, and striking through Georgia and the Confederate heartland.

Johnston knew as Sherman advanced into Georgia he must remain near his only supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad. He fortified strong defensive positions along the railroad, hoping to entice Sherman either to attack him and incur heavy losses, or to expose himself to a Confederate counterattack while attempting to maneuver around him. Johnston would preserve his army by entrenching every step he took, fighting only when attacked, and inviting battle only when conditions were heavily in his favor. Sherman attempted to counter this strategy by holding Johnston in place with George H. Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland, and sending flanking armies under John M. Schofield and James B. McPherson right and left in attempts to cut Johnston’s line of supply and retreat, thus forcing him to come out and fight on even terms. But Johnston repeatedly avoided Sherman’s attempts to force the climactic battle, each time slipping away to fortify yet another strong position. The campaign thus became one of continuous maneuvering, which author Shelby Foote termed “The Red Clay Minuet.”

After a major but indecisive battle at Resaca, Georgia on May 14-15, 1864, Johnston’s army retreated southward while Sherman pursued. Failing to find a good defensive position south of Calhoun, Johnston continued on to Adairsville while the Confederate cavalry fought a skillful rearguard action. On May 17, Sherman concentrated his men in the Adairsville area to attack Johnston the next day. Johnston had originally expected to find a valley at Adairsville of suitable width to deploy his men and anchor his line with its flanks on hills, but the valley was too wide, so Johnston disengaged and withdrew towards Cassville and the easily-defended Allatoona Pass.

On May 18, 1864, at Cassville, Johnston set a trap for Sherman’s forces – leading to what some call the “Cassville Controversy.” He divided his force along two diverging roads at Adairsville and then quickly concentrated them at Cassville, hoping Sherman would attempt the same. Johnston intended to attack one part of Sherman’s divided army while it was in motion, before reinforcements could arrive. Sherman, believing the Confederates had mostly fallen back south of the Etowah River and were thus no longer nearby, did split his army, ordering part to Kingston and his 20th and 23rd Corps under Schofield and Hooker to Cassville, making this column vulnerable to attack from the flank and front. On May 19, Sherman was made aware that there were Confederates near Cassville, and believing them to be just a remnant of Johnston’s force under General Cheatham, ordered his generals to confront that force while his cavalry was sent to block its escape south.

Autograph Letter Signed, in the field near Kingston, Georgia, May 19, 1864, to General Thomas, whose command was situated between Sherman’s in Kingston and the two corps near Cassville, giving him an update on the status of the developing battle and issuing orders concerning it. “…I understand Hooker reported to you this morning that he had sent Butterfield & Williams to feel forward to the Road. Schofield has since reported his arrival at the point occupied by Hooker. And I ordered him several hours ago, by the same messenger that went from the church to move down to Cassville Depot and to order Stoneman to occupy the Line of Pettit Creek. Send the enclosed note to Schofield that he may know a force remains this side…” This letter is a rarity, being just the second Sherman letter from the Atlanta campaign we have ever carried. It is contained in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.

Stoneman’s Union cavalry, mentioned in the above letter, appeared at Confederate General John Hood’s rear just as he was gathering to spring Johnston’s trap, and Hood redeployed his forces instead of attacking. That night, Johnston’s army did indeed begin retreating south of the Etowah, and if Sherman had actually made an error in splitting his forces, the point became moot.

That same day, as all of this was happening, Sherman faced a momentous choice. He could continue along the Western and Atlantic Railroad, his all-weather lifeline, or move south across the Etowah River towards Dallas, in direct pursuit of Johnston. Leaving the railroad meant leaving his source of supply deep in enemy country, and was a risky venture. Sherman’s determination to do so was one of the most important decisions he made during the entire Georgia campaign. Georgia historians call the Etowah “The Rubicon of Georgia,” as Sherman’s crossing it determined the nature of the entire campaign. The information he provided to Thomas in this letter hints at his decision, as he was ordering his troops to “feel forward” down the road leading toward Etowah.  The next day, Sherman ordered his commanders to make provision to subsist their troops independent of the railroad and to secure the fords across the Etowah. On the 23rd, his army made its crossing and embarked on the successful campaign through Georgia, foraging as he went, that would make Sherman’s name famous over a century after his deeds.