Gen. Grant Orders Gen. Meade to Be Prepared for an Assault on Lee’s Army, Referencing Lee by Name During the Petersburg Campaign

Grant: “If the report of the departure of two divisions of Lee’s army can be verified, we will try the assault in front of each of Potters and Wilcox divisions. I can bring over 15,000 men from north of the James to support them if necessary.”

 

It is very rare to find a letter of Grant mentioning Lee, this being our first

 

This letter was formerly property of the President of MIT generations ago and has not been on the market in more than 50 years

The Petersburg campaign consisted of nine months of trench warfare in which Union forces commanded by U.S. Grant assaulted Petersburg unsuccessfully and then constructed trench lines that eventually extended over 30 miles from the eastern outskirts of Richmond, Virginia to around the eastern and southern outskirts of Petersburg. Petersburg was crucial to the supply of Confederate general Robert E. Lee’s army and the Confederate capital of Richmond. Numerous Union raids were conducted and battles fought in attempts to cut off the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad.

By February 1865, Lee had only 45,000 soldiers to oppose Grant’s 110,000. Grant continued to order attacks and cut off rail lines. After the Union victory at the Battle of Hatcher’s Run on February 5–7, 1865, extended the lines another 4 miles, Lee had few reserves after manning the lengthened defenses. Lee knew that his forces could not sustain the defenses much longer and the best chance to continue the war was for part or all of his army to leave the Richmond and Petersburg lines, obtain food and supplies at Danville or possibly Lynchburg, and join Joseph E. Johnston’s force opposing William T. Sherman’s army in North Carolina. If the Confederates could quickly defeat Sherman, they might turn back to oppose Grant before he could combine his forces with Sherman’s. Lee began preparations for the movement and informed Confederate President Jefferson Davis of his plan.

Grant realized that Lee was going to be on the move and wanted to be vigilant and prevent Lee from executing his plan. This involved vigilance, monitoring Lee, and being ready to act. March of 1865 would see the climax of the campaign. Lee’s forces in both Richmond and Petersburg had dwindled to under 45,000, with only 35,000 fit for duty. Grant, on the other hand, had available, or within easy march, a total of at least 150,000. Moreover, Sheridan, having destroyed the remnants of Early’s forces at Waynesboro, Va., on March 2, had cleared the Shenandoah Valley of Confederates and was free to join Grant before Petersburg.

On March 1, 1865, Grant got word that some of Lee’s divisions were on the move, and he wanted to determine if this was true, and if so, take action to counter the threat. At that time, Grant was overall Union commander and General George Meade was commander of the Army of the Potomac. Grant wrote giving Meade orders, first to find out if the news of Lee’s movement was true, and if so, to launch an assault to prevent it from succeeding.

Autograph letter signed, City Point, March 1, 1865, to Gen. George Meade. “If the report of the departure of two divisions of Lee’s army can be verified, we will try the assault in front of each of Potters and Wilcox divisions. I can bring over 15,000 men from north of the James to support them if necessary.”

Lee’s army did not make a breakthrough and his plan to do so never materialized. But later that month, under pressure from President Davis to maintain the defenses of Richmond and unable to move effectively over muddy roads with poorly fed animals in winter in any event, General Lee accepted a plan by General John B. Gordon to launch an attack on Union Fort Stedman designed to break Union lines east of Petersburg or at least compel Grant to shorten the Union Army lines. If this were to be accomplished, Lee would have a better chance to shorten the Confederate lines and send a substantial force, or nearly his whole army, to help Johnston. Gordon’s surprise attack on Fort Stedman in the pre-dawn hours of March 25, 1865, captured the fort, three adjacent batteries and over 500 prisoners while killing and wounding about 500 more Union soldiers. The Union forces promptly counterattacked. and forced the Confederates to return to their lines and in places to give up their advance picket line. On the afternoon of March 25, 1865, at the Battle of Jones’s Farm, Union units captured Confederate picket lines near Armstrong’s Mill which extended the left end of the Union line about 0.25 miles closer to the Confederate fortifications. This put the them within about 0.5 miles of the Confederate line. After the Confederate defeats at Fort Stedman and Jones’s Farm, Lee knew that Grant soon would move against the only remaining Confederate supply lines to Petersburg, the South Side Railroad and the Boydton Plank Road, and possibly cut off all routes of retreat from Richmond and Petersburg. The loss was a devastating blow for Lee’s army, setting up the Confederate defeat at Five Forks on April 1st and the fall of Petersburg on April 2-3rd. The war ended April 9 with Lee’s surrender to Grant.

This letter was formerly property of the President of MIT generations ago and has not been on the market in more than 50 years.