President Dwight D. Eisenhower, In Recalling His Stunned First Impression to the Impending Bomb Drop on Japan in August 1945, Lays the Groundwork for the Great Nuclear Disarmament Debate That Has Lasted Ever Since

On dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, he confesses: “Never has the matter ceased troubling me.” However: “I am sure you would agree that a disarmament agreement with the Soviets, with which we would strictly comply and which they could easily evade, would be worse than none at all.”

 

He writes a noted journalist who was the champion of nuclear disarmament: “I see that you have expressed in powerful and persuasive terms some of the great dangers facing the individual – which means civilization – and the need for that same individual to do something about it.”

In his 1953 ‘Chance for Peace’ speech”, Eisenhower spoke out against an arms race with the Soviets. He even hoped to make a deal with the Soviets that would cease the manufacture of nuclear weapons and instead promote the use of fissionable materials for non-violent purposes (such as power generation). These hopes never materialized, as neither side wished to allow inspections. Once the Soviet Union successfully tested the hydrogen bomb in 1955, it had less motivation to negotiate; which conversely increased reliance on nuclear weapons in the U.S.

Norman Cousins was the Editor-in-Chief of the Saturday Review, a widely read and well respected weekly magazine of the arts and sciences. He also became a leading advocate for world peace and nuclear disarmament, and was co-chairman of the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Cousins began his efforts to end nuclear weapons explosions in the 1950s. During the 1956 U.S. presidential campaign, he helped convince former Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, to make the halting of nuclear testing a key issue in his campaign. President Eisenhower opposed the ban. In 1957 Cousins established a major nuclear disarmament organization: the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. SANE became the key player in the anti-nuclear testing firmament. Later he served as intermediary between President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and engineered the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

On August 4, 1956, Cousins published a sweeping Saturday Review editorial entitled, “Think of a Man”. He briskly summarized the entire intellectual history of mankind – from art and literature to medicine, science and architecture – and argued that for the first time in human history, it could all be wiped out. He discussed questions of nuclear testing, the effects of the hydrogen bomb, and radioactive fallout, and called for disarmament. He sought nothing less than a wholesale reevaluation of the idea of security and an end to nuclear testing. He sent a copy of the editorial to President Eisenhower.

In his book, “Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military Industrial Complex”, author James Ledbetter writes that “even before the Sputnik launch [in 1957], Eisenhower appeared to be shifting away from the view that nuclear weapons were a cost effective method of achieving security with few side effects. His meditations about the moral, military, and scientific complexities of nuclear weapons were often prompted by his correspondence with Norman Cousins.” Ike could have ignored the editorial, yet writes Ledbetter, “Something in Cousin’s argument rekindled the vision Eisenhower had expressed in his 1953 ‘Chance for Peace’ speech.”

Eisenhower replied on August 6, the 11th anniversary of the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima. Ledbetter sees Ike’s statements in the letter as important and mentions them in some detail. He relates that Ike found the editorial persuasive, and that he confessed that he had had similar thoughts. In 1945, General Eisenhower had been informed before the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan. He relates in his Memoirs his response to the administration opposing using the bomb: “First on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face’. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude…” After the war, the question turned to the arms race, containment of the Soviets, and monitoring testing, a debate that in somewhat different form continues today.

Typed Letter Signed, on White House letterhead, two pages, Washington, August 6, 1956, to Cousins and marked “PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL”, being the very letter referenced in “Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military Industrial Complex”. In it he deals with the challenges of monitoring weapons, the power of the bombs at that point, and the roll of personal responsibility as a rersult, and what emerges in powerful strokes are the feelings of a man who at one time served as Chief Allied Commander in World War II and subsequently, in this letter, as President.

“Up to this moment I have had only the time to read your editorial most sketchily. Because of its meaningful character I shall, later, ponder it seriously. But even so, I see that you have expressed in powerful and persuasive terms some of the great dangers facing the individual – which means civilization – and the need for that same individual to do something about it. I started thinking along these lines when I learned that the first atomic bomb had been successfully tested in 1945 and that the United States planned to use it against a Japanese city. Never has the matter ceased troubling me. As early as 1947 I put into a book I wrote a germ or two of the ideas you express so eloquently.

“There is one human habit or trait that you have not brought to the fore. It seems to be an historical fact that when a people become strong, prosperous, and on the whole contented with their lot, it becomes very difficult to reach them with an idea that requires them to think of unpleasant possibilities or to undertake the work and effort required to eliminate such possibilities.

“There is, moreover, one other disturbing fact that you do not mention, even though you are possibly aware of it. This fact is that there is no presently known method by which could be uncovered, and counted, even sizable numbers of hydrogen and other bombs already manufactured and deliberately concealed. It is possible, with the consent of the manufacturing country for rigid inspection, to keep rather close track of new fissionable material produced, as well as its use. Here you find the reason why certain of my disarmament proposals have talked about uses of fissionable material produced in the future rather than about that already manufactured into bombs. I am sure you would agree that a disarmament agreement with the Soviets, with which we would strictly comply and which they could easily evade, would be worse than none at all. This would be true of either a bilateral or a collective treaty.

“To me it is especially encouraging to see that intelligent people are studying this problem so seriously. Thank you very much for bringing your article to my attention. I am going to circulate it among some of my close associates here.” Provenance: the Cousin’s estate.

This letter demonstrates unique foresight and deep appreciation of the issues by Eisenhower. He was rightly thoughtful to have his doubts and correct in his vision of the primary challenges facing a nuclear world. His first reaction to the bomb in 1945 presaged a decades and perhaps centuries-long struggle to control the powerful weapons that mankind has created.