Former Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin, From Ghent, Informs the Ambassador in Paris that the US Will Not Send an Agent to the Congress of Vienna to Influence the Post-Napoleonic Peace

The War of 1812 had been raging for two years. The U.S. government faced a very challenging financial situation, brought on by restricted trade and almost two decades of seizures of merchant ships at sea, and now by a war on its own soil. Revenues were down to about one half of what was required, and prospects were for a $50 million shortfall by the end of the year. It needed to take steps to raise money, and quickly. Without further funds, there was a real question as to whether the government would be able to pay to maintain the army and navy during wartime. Specie (hard money) payments were severely restricted, and many US banks could not or would not extend the credit. Moreover, merchants would accept Treasury bills only at a steep discount.

To meet this challenge, on March 24, 1814, Congress authorized the President to raise the money by borrowing up to $25 million. This prompted a lively public debate on the nation’s capacity to sustain a debt of that size. So the government determined to do the borrowing in tranches (portions), in the belief that advertising the loan in pieces would cause less controversy and perhaps make the government’s loan efforts more successful.  It was stated that the government loan for $6 million would be taken in Europe. Though many were skeptical of this, the skeptics proved wrong.

In May of 1814, President Madison wrote his Treasury Secretary, “Should we find it necessary to resort to Europe for the next loan, there may be little time to spare in authorizing the negotiation. The loan we have obtained… cannot be calculated on to meet our demands beyond the month of August; or at the farthest, September. Hence it appears desirable to make some provision at an early day, if practicable, to guard against embarrassment in our Treasury-operations.” The Treasury Secretary’s annual report was dire: the effectiveness of the British blockade combined with weariness of lenders meant that less and less was being taken in, as more and more was spent.

On September 29, 1814, John Quincy Adams wrote in his journal: “[Boyd] left Washington the 12th of last month at twelve hours notice and sailed on the 16th from New York in the Transit, a fast sailing Baltimore schooner. He arrived at Bordeaux the 17th of this month at Paris the 23d and here this morning at six o clock having travelled from Paris day and night. His dispatches and newspapers are to the 12th of August. Those from the Treasury are in the first instance for Mr. Gallatin with powers to negotiate a loan in Holland of six millions of dollars. They are to me only in the case of Mr Gallatin’s absence and to Mr. Crawford in case the loan should not be obtainable at Amsterdam.” William H. Crawford was U.S. ambassador to France.

On October 3, Gallatin wrote at length to the Willinks (bankers in Holland with a track record of investing in the United States) seeking funds up to $6 million.  These were confidential communications so as not to alert others that the Americans were seeking such funding in Europe. Gallatin received a response from Willinks, explaining that they would be unable to lend the money on terms that were likely to be acceptable.  So the US government and Ghent negotiators turned to Crawford to seek funds in Paris.

The Congress of Vienna was a conference of ambassadors of European states chaired by Austrian statesman Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, and held in Vienna from November 1814 to June 1815, though the delegates had arrived and were already negotiating by late September 1814. The objective of the Congress was to provide a long-term peace plan for Europe by settling critical issues arising from the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars. The goal was not simply to restore old boundaries but to resize the main powers so they could balance each other off and remain at peace.

As the Americans aimed at negotiating peace with the British, they also were seeking out alliances and counterbalances against Britain from the other major powers.  With this in mind, they prepared to send an official report to the newly arriving ministers in Vienna for the Congress to influence the negotiations there.

John Quincy Adams discussed this incident in his diary. He noted, “At two o’clock we had the meeting of the mission.  The instructions from the Secretary of State to Mr. Shaler were produced, and they direct him to go to the place wherever a Congress might be held for a general peace, and communicate any useful information that he could obtain there to the joint mission and to the Government…. Mr. Clay proposed that Mr. Shaler (one of the secretaries to the Ghent legation) should be dispatched to Vienna, to give us, and the Government, and Mr. Crawford, information concerning the proceedings of the Congress. He added that though he still thought a communication to the Emperor of Russia might be proper, yet since the last note we received from the British Plenipotentiaries (making further demands regarding Indian rights and territories) and our answer, it might as well be postponed, or at least must be somewhat altered. Mr. Gallatin advised that if Shaler went, he should first go to Paris, and there get a passport from Mr. Crawford, which would be less likely to excite suspicion or remark than if he should go directly from this place.”

A couple days later, the U.S. negotiators met again.  The prospect of a direct meeting with the Emperor of Russia, and the ambivalence of the French as expressed by Crawford, led them to re-think their plan.  Some did not trust Shaler to engage in delicate diplomacy. The negotiators also decided it was fruitless to attempt to influence the affairs in Vienna.

Autograph letter signed, from Ghent, October 19, 1814, to Crawford. “Dear Sir, Mr. Baker fell sick at Lille and your letter of the 6th inst. reached me only night before last.  Mr. Adams and myself had previously prepared a letter on the subject of the loan which we will nevertheless send you.

“Some difficulties have prevented our sending to Vienna which, so far as a communication of the state of negotiations have went, would have been useful.  The unfitness of the person contemplated by the Govt. for the object of attending our European Congress and the fear that he might do more injury than good, and the impossibility of making, by the means of any messenger, a personal communication to the Emperor of Russia, may be enumerated among the causes of that not being done.  Upon the whole I do not believe that any great benefit would have been derived from the measure.  If either Russia or France intends to take any step really useful to the United States, that intention will be communicated and both the indifference evinced at our proceedings here and the silence of the French Govt. towards you are ominous.  If France meant or apprehended a rupture with England, what anxiety would she not feel about the continuance of our war?  If Russia intended to bring forward the maritime questions or American peace, it would have been communicated to us in some manner.

“As to G. Britain having little more or less weight in the continental arrangements, from the benefit which may prevail respecting the issue of the negotiations here, does not appear to me to be of any great importance.  We cannot make any power quarrel with her at Vienna.  If peace is there definitively settled, the worse the conditions for France and the more British pride will be gratified by the result, the better will be the prospect of its downfall and of the short duration of the peace.”

We acquired this letter from the Crawford descendants, and it has never before been offered for sale.

Negotiations at Vienna were interrupted by Napoleon’s escape from Elba and the 100 days of his return to power before his defeat at Waterloo.