Henry Clay, the War Hawk Who Had Promoted the War of 1812, First Reacts to the British Burning of Washington, in a Famous Letter

He was also distressed about American Forces being set back in Canada: “I tremble indeed whenever I take up a late Newspaper. Hope alone sustains me.”  On hearing of his reelection: “Europe has no attractions for me sufficient to detain me here beyond the termination of my present duties or to bring me back again, when I shall be so happy as once more to see our native land.”

On August 8, 1814, talks began at Ghent, Belgium, that would ultimately result in a treaty ending the War of 1812. The head of the American negotiating team was John Quincy Adams, the U.S.’s most experienced diplomat. The four men who served with him were carefully selected by President Madison to reflect the varieties of political sentiment in the United States. Foremost among them was Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and a noted War Hawk. He and his colleagues had argued that military force was the only option left to combat British imperiousness. Albert Gallatin had served as Secretary of the Treasury for both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. James Bayard was a U.S. Senator belonging to the Federalist Party who had been an opponent of the war, and was one of the 13 Senators to vote against declaring it. However, once the war began he supported the war effort. Jonathan Russell was acting U.S. ambassador to Britain when war was declared. Sent to Ghent as a negotiator, he was also serving as ambassador to Sweden and Norway.

William H. Crawford was U.S. ambassador to France during the negotiations, and was responsible for superintending the American consuls in Europe and keeping them informed of developments. More than that, he was an advisor to the President on the happenings on the Continent. As Ambassador to the Court of one of the two major adversaries in the conflicts in Europe, he was also actively involved in the Ghent negotiation process, advising the negotiators and responding to their confidential communiqués.  He would later serve as Secretary of War and Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Madison and Monroe.

At the start the U.S. negotiators had their instructions: the impressment of seamen and illegal blockades were the principal cause of the war,” which would “cease as soon as these rights are respected.” British cruisers must not be allowed to stop and search U.S. vessels, which practice “withholds the respect due our flag…It is expected that all American seamen who have been impressed will be discharged.” Another major object of the negotiations was to end the British blockades. “We also need to be assured that no further interference with our commerce” will take place. Next the instructions took up the question of the British arming and supplying the Indians. The article in the Treaty of 1794 “allowing “British traders from Canada and the North to trade with the Indian Tribes in the U.S., must not be renewed.” Nor must Britain continue to use native forces against “our Western States and Territories.” Thus, the U.S. negotiators must insist on an end to impressment, and ship seizures, and a stop to aiding the Indians in the American west.

As for the British, they initially demanded that the country now occupied by the states of Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, the larger part of Indiana, and about one third of Ohio, should be set apart for the Indians to serve as a buffer, a perpetual protection of the British possessions against American ambition. They demanded also that the United States should relinquish the right of keeping any armed vessels on the Great Lakes; and, in addition to all this, they asked for the cession of a piece of Maine, and for the right of navigating the Mississippi River. The Americans rejected these demands out of hand, and actively considered going home at the end of August. They ended up staying, and over the coming weeks there discussions, sending of notes and replies, references of disputed points by the British commissioners to their Foreign Office in London, and long waiting for answers.

On August 24, 1814, British forces under General Robert Ross overwhelmed American militiamen at the Battle of Bladensburg, Maryland, and marched unopposed into Washington, D.C. Most congressmen and officials fled the nation’s capital as soon as word came of the American defeat, but President James Madison and his wife, Dolley, escaped just before the invaders arrived. The British army entered Washington in the late afternoon, and General Ross and British officers dined that night at the deserted White House. Meanwhile, the British troops, ecstatic that they had captured their enemy’s capital, began setting the city aflame. The White House, a number of federal buildings, and several private homes were destroyed. The still uncompleted Capitol building was also set on fire, and the House of Representatives and the Library of Congress were gutted before a torrential downpour doused the flames. On August 26, General Ross, realizing his untenable hold on the capital area, ordered a withdrawal from Washington. The next day, President Madison returned to a smoking and charred Washington and vowed to rebuild the city. It took well over a month for the news to reach Ghent, with news of the dismal event arriving on early October. Clay was stunned, and did not quickly write his feelings about the event.

News was also bad from American forces in Canada. Commodore Isaac Chauncey, in command of U.S. naval forces on Lakes Erie and Ontario, did not consider support of the land forces to be a part of his mission, and had refused the pleas of General Jacob J. Brown for help. Meanwhile, at the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, Generals Brown and Winfield Scott were wounded. The campaign ended with Sir Gordon Drummond, civil and military Governor of Upper Canada, strongly established on a line anchored at Fort Niagara. In early November the Americans would blow up Fort Erie and abandon Canada. Taking Canada was one of the War Hawks’ chief purposes in promoting the war, so its loss was devastating to their original purpose.

In the negotiations, the Americans sought each party to make a draft treaty (called in French a “projet”), and then exchange drafts. But the British saw a competitive advantage in forcing the Americans to act first, and also claimed this was a matter of etiquette; they refused to prepare a draft. Clay now remained the only U.S. negotiator that believed the talks would end in a satisfactory peace.

The Congress of Vienna was the peace conference called to decide the future of Europe after the fall of Napoleon. The main allies – Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia – were joined by other nations affected by the Napoleonic Wars, such as Spain, Portugal and Sweden. The four main powers intended to dictate borders, which the French delegation, led by Foreign Minister Talleyrand, opposed. The core four were much disturbed by his arguments, knowing that the smaller powers would support Talleyrand if they gave him the chance of appealing to them. They had no intention of giving way, however, and refused to summon a meeting of all the representatives. The Congress was postponed. This aided the American cause, as unable to finalize peace in Europe, the British could not turn their full attention to the American war.

Autograph report signed, with initials, three pages, Ghent, October 17, 1814, to Crawford, with his reactions to the burning of Washington, the failure of the U.S. military in Canada, and containing a report on the status of the peace talks. “I wish, my dear Crawford, it were possible to pass over in silence, & bring in oblivion, the distressing events which have occurred at home. But it would be vain to attempt to conceal that they have given me the deepest affliction. The enemy it is true has lost much in character, at least in the estimation of the impartial world. And the loss of public property gives me comparatively no pain. What does wound me to the very soul is that a set of pirates and incendiaries should have been permitted to pollute our soil, conflagrate our Capital, and return unpunished to their ships! No consolation is afforded us by the late intelligence from America. It appears that by the unfortunate failure of Chauncey to cooperate with Brown the campaign is lost, and we are compelled everywhere to act on the defensive. Drummond, who I thought was caught, will escape if he does not take gains, and consequently Chauncey’s whole flotilla is seriously menaced. I tremble indeed whenever I take up a late Newspaper. Hope alone sustains me.

“My last letter apprized you that we had rejected the proposition, made a sine qua non, to include the Indians in the peace, as the allies of G. Britain; and expressed the expectation that a rupture of the negotiation, or an abandonment of the principle by the other party must probably ensue. Neither alternative has occurred. Still coming down, they have changed again their ground, and sent in an article of which the inclosed is a Copy, which they declared to be their ultimatum, and that upon our acceptance of it depended their remaining in Ghent. As this article strips their principle of some of its most exceptionable features, and as we did not like a rupture upon such ground, especially as it was highly probable that the article itself would be inoperative, by a previous pacification with the Indians, we concluded to accept it, with the full knowledge by the other party that our Government, having given no instructions on the subject, was free to adopt or reject it. We invited at the same time the presentation to us of a projet [draft] of a treaty, offering immediately after to furnish a counter-projet. Our answer to this effect was delivered on Friday last, and we have since been informally told that it has been sent to London; and that no reply will be given until the return of the messenger, which will be about the first of next week.

“There is much reason to believe that the other party has aimed to protract the negotiation here so as to make it subservient to his views at Vienna. Under this persuasion I urged the propriety of placing the true state and prospects of the whole business in possession of the French and Russian Governments; and had actually prepared a letter which was agreed to be sent to you from the mission. But the complexion of the last note seems to render this course somewhat questionable, especially at this late period, and when there is so little reason to hope for co-operation from any part of Europe.

“We have however deemed it eligible, in consonance with views entertained by the Govt. when I left America, in relation to a Congress which it was supposed would be held upon the Rhine, to send Mr. Shaler to Vienna to collect what information he can. He will go in no official known character, and will observe all practicable secrecy. If you can furnish him any letters calculated to promote the object of his mission or can facilitate, after arriving at Vienna, his correspondence with us, you will oblige us. Perhaps this latter aid may be obtained through the French Couriers. You have been apprized of the 25h. inst. being fixed for the sailing of the Chauncey. I think it probable that it may be a day or two later.

“I hope my omitting to communicate heretofore to you my decision as to the mission which you fill has subjected you to no inconvenience; indeed I cannot suppose that any such effect could happen. When you first mentioned your kind offer to me I expected very soon to be with you in Paris, and hence delayed making it. I find, by a letter which Mr. Boyd brought me, that the District I formerly represented in Congress has again returned me. I cannot therefore accept of any situation which would disable me from fulfilling the expectations of those who have so honorably noticed me. Had not that event occurred Europe has no attractions for me sufficient to detain me here beyond the termination of my present duties or to bring me back again, when I shall be so happy as once more to see our native land. P.S. Since writing the preceding, we have abandoned the intention of sending Mr. Shaler. H C.”

The full signature was cut out at the end of the letter over half a century ago, though no text was lost. The signature with initials, however, remains.  It is also signed in postscript by Charles Hughes, the secretary of the legation.

According to the book “Henry Clay and the War of 1812” by Quentin Scott King, this letter was where we first learn Clay’s feelings about the burning of Washington, DC.  It was acquired by us from a direct descendant of William H. Crawford, and it has never before been offered for sale.