Henry Clay, Newly Arrived to Negotiate Peace with the British in the War of 1812, Triumphantly Predicts Victory But Fears the Fall of Napoleon Will Allow the British to Put More Resources into the War Against the United States

He gives his opinion on the importance of impressment to the completion of negotiations

The U.S. was unprepared for the War of 1812, and the fortunes of war proved vacillating. There were successes, such as William Henry Harrison’s victory in the northwest in the Battle of the Thames, in which Tecumseh was killed, and Oliver H. Perry’s victory on Lake Erie. But there were also failures, such as Gen. James Wilkinson’s expedition against Montreal; also, Fort Niagara was lost, Black Rock and Buffalo were burned, and great quantities of provisions and stores destroyed. The American hope of conquering Canada began to look like a dream, and the threat remained that the British and their Indian allies might yet gain a hold over territory in the American west in order to create an Indian buffer state between the U.S. and the Mississippi River. The British blockade of the U.S. eastern seaboard was constantly growing tighter; not a single American man-of-war was on the open sea. Meanwhile the discontent with the war prevailing in New England, which was destined to culminate in the Hartford Convention, continued to be active and to threaten rebellious outbreaks. But the most ominous event was the worstening and then downfall of Napoleon’s prospects, the likely conclusion of peace in Europe, and, in consequence, the liberation of the military, naval, and financial resources of Great Britain for a vigorous prosecution of the war in America. In 1813 the Americans agreed to mediation to end the war, but the British declined and instead in early 1814 offered direct peace talks to be held at Gothenburg on the west coast of Sweden. The U.S. accepted that offer.

The head of the American negotiating team was John Quincy Adams, the U.S.’s most experienced diplomat. The four men who served with him were carefully selected by President Madison to reflect the varieties of political sentiment in the United States. Foremost among them was Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and a noted War Hawk. Albert Gallatin had served as Secretary of the Treasury for both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. James Bayard was a U.S. Senator belonging to the Federalist Party who had been an opponent of the war, and was one of the 13 Senators to vote against declaring it. However, once the war began he supported the war effort. Jonathan Russell was acting U.S. ambassador to Britain when war was declared. In addition to being a negotiator, he was also serving as ambassador to Sweden and Norway. He proved instrumental in achieving the final peace terms. Adams, Gallatin and Bayard were already in Europe for the abortive mediation effort. Clay and Russell traveled from the U.S. to Europe, arriving at Gothenburg on April 14, 1814. There they found that the site of the negotiations had been moved to Ghent, Belgium, where they would go with some reluctance, as that city was garrisoned by British troops.

William H. Crawford was sent as U.S. ambassador to France in 1813, with orders to demand the repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees (put in place by Napoleon to attempt to strangle the British Islands, but in doing so interfering with U.S. commerce), to protest violations of American trading interests, and to attempt to negotiate a commercial treaty. During the peace negotiations, he was responsible for superintending the American consuls in Europe and keeping them informed of developments. More than that, he was an advisor to the President on the happenings on the Continent. As Ambassador to the Court of one of the two major adversaries in the conflicts in Europe, he was also actively involved in the Ghent negotiation process, advising the negotiators and responding to their confidential communiqués. He would later serve as Secretary of War and Secretary of the Treasury under Presidents Madison and Monroe.

In the Spring of 1814, Napoleon was sent to exile on the island of Elba and peace negotiations were well underway, diminishing the importance of France. England could turn its eyes west.

Autograph letter signed, Ghent, July 2, 1814, to Crawford. “I reached this place on Tuesday last after a journey for the most part excessively unpleasant, and found here three of my colleagues, from one of whom I had the pleasure to receive your agreeable favor of the 10th ulto. I also had for the first time an opportunity of reading your interesting communications to the joint mission, and I beg you to accept my individual thanks, as you deserve those of your Country, for the exertions you have made in promoting the [____] of our labours. On the subject of our instructions, in relation to the great question on which the War has turned, my opinion is, that they do not leave us at liberty to conclude a treaty without a relinquishment on the part of the enemy of the pretension complained of. Still I do not believe, in the actual condition of things, that if the continuance of the War depended upon that single point, the American Government would persist in their demand of the abandonment of what is now a mere theoretic pretension, the practical evil having for the present ceased; and if I were persuaded that the interests of our Country demanded of me the personal risk of a violation of instructions I should not hesitate to incur it. But the determination of this question depends on the enquiry whether now or a few months hence, when we could certainly hear from home, is the most favorable time for us to negotiate. A more unfavorable moment than the present certainly never could occur, and in this statement you appear to concur, as every other person must. Will the condition be worse a few months hence? On the other side of the Atlantic every thing we hear is cheering — the Creek war terminated — 10 millions of the loan filled on terms highly encouraging — rapid progress made on Ontario in the construction of vessels which will give us the ascendancy there; and every reasonable prospect, from these and other circumstances which I will not trouble you with enumerating, of a successful issue to the Campaign. I do not believe, whatever efforts the British Government may make, that they can throw any considerable force into America so as to affect materially the present Campaign. No treaty that we can now conclude can arrest the progress of this campaign.

“On this side of the Atlantic is the aspect of affairs likely, by the delay I have supposed, to become worse for us? I think, my dear Sir, affairs here are far from being settled. This Country (I mean the Low Countries) appears to be about to be occupied by the British. For what? It will at least as to us have the effect of giving occupation to a portion of that force which might be sent agt. us. We know that all the great interests of Germany are unsettled. Altho’ peace has been made, all the difficult points seem to have been put over to the Congress at Vienna. Is even France, conquered France, satisfied? When she has heaved from her bosom the immense foreign armies that now weigh her down, and her own shall have taken their place, will she not seek to efface the disgrace which her Arms have incurred?

“If the negotiation is brought to the single issue, all other questions being disposed of, that we must now, without waiting to hear from America, sign a treaty, waiving the relinquishment of the pretension of impressment, I confess I should pause before I consented to a total rupture of the negotiation. But, my friend, it appears to me, holding the opinion that I do, on the subject of a short delay, that it will be our interest so to manage the negotiation as to take advantage in the turn of events here or at home. I should like to have your views on this matter, which it is not necessary to add, would have great influence with me. I confess I am inclined to think that the British Government will have no difficulty in making a peace leaving Impres’t untouched. They will doubtless set up many claims — they will lay their demands, but rely upon it ultimately (and that even without any change here or in America) they will be content to cast us and make us go hence etc. Why shd. they not? Undoubtedly, if we say nothing about impressment, they triumph in the contest.

“As to acknowledging their right, our governmt. would neither permit us to sign, nor would I ever sign, a treaty embracing such a stipulation.

“Mr. Wilson’s project is very much that which Mr. Jeffrey, Editor of the E. Review, when in America, suggested. Altho’ it would probably be better for the victims of this tyranny than the existing practice, my opinion is that as it respects the nation, it is not a subject of compromise — there is no midway point on which honor can rest between abandonment of the practice, and total silence in relation to it.

“I agree heartily with you that if we can make no peace it is a solemn duty enjoined by our situations so to conduct the negotiation as to satisfy the nation that a vigorous and united exertion alone will preserve it.

“I thank you for your attention to my request relative to my purposed visit to Paris, and to my friend Mr. Carrol. I long much to see you, but I cannot yet say when I shall have that gratification.

This place is quite comfortable, infinitely more so than Gottenburg. But what think you of our being surrounded by a British garrison?

“I confide this letter, which I shd. not trust to the mail, to Mr. Connell, whom I have found a genuinely intelligent and confidential American.”

A hole in the center of the letter affects approximately 3 words.