President Franklin Roosevelt Seeks a Back Channel to the British Leadership

In the early New Deal years, the attention of Roosevelt and the nation was concentrated on domestic issues, such as the survival of the economy and a return to prosperity. The state of the world was, however, troubling to the President, as even before he took office, Japan had invaded China and Hitler had become chancellor of Germany. He, like many Americans, had a long-standing pro-Chinese inclination and despised the violent bullying and worse that swept Germany starting from day one under Hitler. However, traditional American isolationism in the nation and Congress was strong, and FDR agreed with their aim that the U.S. should stay out of any future wars around the world.

1937 was a watershed year for him, one in which he changed his thinking about the American position in foreign conflicts and affairs, and attempted to gather domestic support for a more activist American role. He also recognized the need to coordinate actions with the international community if the world hoped to stem the tide of the dictators, and took the initiative to effect this end. The immediate crisis began building in 1935 when the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, an attack the international community seemed unable to respond to meaningfully.

In 1936, Germany retook the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and became extremely bellicose after that success; it was now focusing on Austria. In addition, German intervention became more blatant and massive in Spain. From its perch in northern China, Japan eyed hungrily the rest of the huge Chinese mainland. The conflict greatly escalated in July 1937, with a militant Japanese prime minister declaring a “new order” in Asia and total war. By August, major cities were being bombed in terror attacks; then the Japanese declared a blockade of the Chinese coast. Roosevelt was now deeply concerned by the events in China.

On August 10, the U.S. offered informally to the Japanese Government its good offices towards the settlement of the controversy between Japan and China. No response was received. Then, on October 5, FDR spoke out against rigid isolationist policies, proposing that peace-loving nations make concerted efforts to quarantine aggressors. “…Civilians, including vast numbers of women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air. In times of so-called peace, ships are being attacked and sunk by submarines without cause or notice. Nations are fomenting and taking sides in civil warfare in nations that have never done them any harm. Nations claiming freedom for themselves deny it to others…When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.”

This quarantine proposal created such alarm at home (with public opinion strongly opposed to any action that could lead to war), and met with such tepid response abroad, that FDR realized that he must act with caution and lay the groundwork if he believed that further involvement was necessary. Within a month that groundwork was already being laid for him, as in November, the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis was formed and Hitler told his generals to prepare for war. As the Japanese moved through South China, American gunboats evacuated most of the Embassy staff from Nanking during November 1937.

In December, Nanking fell and over 200,000 civilians were killed in the Japanese assault. To make matters more grim, on December 12, Japanese naval aircraft were ordered by their army to attack “any and all ships” in the Yangtze River above Nanking, and they then sank the U.S. ship Panay; 3 Americans were killed and 48 wounded. Roosevelt instructed Secretary of State Cordell Hull to deliver a letter of protest to the Japanese ambassador in Washington, advising the Japanese government that he was “deeply shocked and concerned.” The President demanded an apology, full compensation for the attack, and assurances guaranteeing against a similar episode in the future.

On December 24, the U.S. government received a formal apology from Tokyo, which was more satisfactory than FDR had expected. The Japanese government would, of course, punish those responsible for the ‘grave blunder’ caused by ‘poor visibility’ and pay full reparations. In May 1937, Neville Chamberlain succeeded Stanley Baldwin as prime minister of Great Britain. With war clouds over Europe, and conflict already exploded in Spain, he was unwilling to go down in history as responsible for the outbreak of another world war. Chamberlain had no faith in collective security and openly advocated accommodating the dictators, believing that he could deal with them. His hope for peace for Britain rested on the possibility of satisfying the ambitions of Hitler and Mussolini short of their supremacy in the Mediterranean or western Europe.

This policy was ultimately so unsuccessful that the very word he used for it, “appeasement,” has become a slur. Yet, in looking for potential allies for a firmer policy against the now-united dictators, Roosevelt had little choice but to turn to this man as leader of Britain. Chamberlain had on October 8 publicly endorsed the President’s Quarantine Address and stated that in his call for a concerted effort for peace, “he will have this Government whole-heartedly with him.” However, he met FDR’s call for an international conference to forge concerted action with a cold reception. In November 1937 the U.S. did participate with 18 other nations in a conference held at Brussels to consider “peaceable means” for hastening the end of the conflict between China and Japan. It quickly ended up as a toothless tiger, voting to disband without recommending (no less requiring) any action.

The British blamed Roosvelt for the failure, and the affair made headlines around the world. Despite this, FDR was still, as the following letter illustrates, hoping that the British could be brought around to take a common position with the U.S. By year’s end, Roosevelt had decided to propose a joint British-American naval blockade of Japan, and was just days away from the announcement. He was also finalizing a secret communication to Chamberlain, to be delivered to the British Ambassador in Washington. It would sound out British support for an appeal by FDR that all governments work to reach unanimous agreement on: 1) principles of acceptable international conduct; 2) limitation and reduction of armaments; 3) methods of promoting economic pacification through equality of treatment and opportunity; and 4) outlawing of inhuman methods of warfare.

The President would end his appeal by proposing that the U.S. and nine other nations representative of all regions of the world should meet as an “executive committee” to draw up specific proposals for submission to all governments as a basis for universal agreement. In a very Rooseveltian gesture, in addition to contacts within the formal diplomatic circles, he tried to reach Chamberlain outside of them, believing that if he could just speak with him man-to-man, without the interference of the bureaucrats, they could come to an agreement. It was a strategy that he used with enormous success domestically, and would use again with Winston Churchill just a few years later. Arthur Murray, Viscount Elibank, was a long-time Liberal Member of Parliament who later went on to the House of Lords. He had known the Roosevelts since 1917 when he was the Assistant Military Attache at the British Embassy in Washington while FDR was Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

The two continued their acquaintance, becoming so close that Murray addressed Roosevelt as “Franklin”, even while he was in the Oval Office; FDR told Cordell Hull that Murray was “an English friend of mine”. In the 1930’s, Murray was Chairman of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire, and very well connected. The Roosevelt/Murray informal exchanges on foreign affairs were fairly extensive between 1936 and 1940, with Murray seeming to have acted as a kind of conduit between Roosevelt and British officials. Now Roosevelt wrote to Murray, surely expecting that his thoughts would be passed on to the British government.

Typed Letter Signed, one page 4to, Washington, December 31, 1937, to Col. Murray. “What a delightful tribute that is to Lord Grey – and what a satisfaction it must be to you to have worked worked with him and known him so well. I am wondering where you and Faith are this winter. The latitude of Scotland sounds cold but you have told me of the proximity of the Gulf Stream and perhaps you are spending the winter there before going to London. I do wish you would both come over again this coming year, especially if you could come to Hyde Park while I am there. Things international still drift in the wrong direction in spite of the success we have had in getting a quick and on the whole fairly satisfactory reply from Japan. I am glad to say that your government people seem at last to be ready and willing to converse with me “off the record and informally” – but I still wish we could have more of that sort of thing without its getting out into your papers and ours. The happiest of New Years to you both.”

The two initiatives he was to propose in the following days were Roosevelt’s last glimmer of hope to stop the onrushing catastrophe of war by concerted action of the World War I allies. Chamberlain, however, was more interested in back channels to the dictators than to FDR. He rejected the President’s proposed naval blockade, and also responded negatively to his secret communication, because FDR’s plan would interfere with his intention of appeasing Hitler and Mussolini. He even told Roosevelt that he was offering Mussolini recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia in return for unspecified “evidence” of his “desire to contribute to the restoration of confidence and friendly relations.” Thus, by late January 1938, FDR realized the futility of any present effort to place international roadblocks in the paths of the dictators. He would not have another chance before it was too late. In March 1938 Japan mobilized for total war, and on the 12th of that same month, Hitler occupied Austria, setting in motion a chain of events which led to Munich later in the year. Murray wrote on the side of this letter, “We spent 10 days with him at Hyde Park in the following year, October 1938. Arthur Murray, June 1939.” Close friends indeed. At the top right, he added, “I gift this letter to Miss Penelope Gillespie, London, August 1953.” Both of the inscriptions are very faded and thus difficult to read. Included is a letter from Miss Gillespie giving the letter in 1972 to Nancy & Dillard Spriggs of Petroleum Analysis Ltd., an oil industry consulting firm, from whom we obtained it. This is the first time it is being offered to the public.